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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
SIRIUS LC, a Wyoming Limited Liability Company, 
BRYCE H. ERICKSON, and any person claiming under by or through Bryce H. Erickson in and 
to the real property described as follows: 
CARIBOU COUNTY, IDAHO: 
TOWNSHIP 5 SOUTH, RANGE 46 E.B.M., 
SECTION 27: LOTS 1 AND 2, N112 
NW114, EXCEPT THEREFROM THE S % 
NE114 NW '/4 NW114, 
Supreme Court Docket No. 36466-2009 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District for Caribou County, 
Honorable Mitchell W. Brown, District Judge, presiding. 
Bryan D. Smith, Esq., residing at Idaho Falls, Idaho, for Appellant, Bryce I-I. Erickson 
A. Bruce Larson, Esq., residing at Pocatello, Idaho, for Respondent, Sirius LC 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In October 1998, Bryce Erickson, a farmerlrancher, retained attorney William Bagley of 
Wyoming to file for bankruptcy protection and stay the foreclosure of Erickson's farm. On 
October 8, 1998, Bagley filed a petition for Chapter 11 bankruptcy for Erickson. However, 
seven months later on May 11, 1999, the court dismissed the bankruptcy for failure to prosecute, 
i.e., inability to effectuate a plan, unreasonable delay, failure to prosecute a plan, and failure to 
pay quarterly fees. After the bankruptcy was dismissed, Bagley began representing Erickson 
outside of bankruptcy against the very same claims of the Chapter 11 creditors. By December 3, 
1999, Bagley again filed for bankruptcy protection for Erickson but this time under Chapter 12. 
However, before Bagley would agree to file the Chapter 12, Bagley had Erickson sign a 
$29,173.38 promissory note and mortgage in favor of plaintiff, Sirius LC ("Sirius"), a limited 
liability company Bagley owns, securing the promissory note with Erickson's farm in Caribou 
County. 
Eventually, the bankruptcy court in the Chapter 12 discovered that Bagley owned the 
plaintiff thereby making Bagley a creditor in the Chapter 12 and disqualifying Bagley from 
representing Erickson in the Chapter 12 because of a conflict of interest. After the court 
disqualified Bagley, Erickson retained Judith A. Shively who successfully completed a court 
approved plan of reorganization under Chapter 12. The plaintiff eventually filed this action after 
Erickson refused to pay the plaintiff on the promissory note because Bagley's representation of 
Erickson in the Chapter 11 and subsequently was incompetent, conflicted, and already over paid 
by virtue of a $5,000 retainer Erickson had paid Bagley initially upon filing the Chapter 11. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In October 1998, Bryce Erickson ("Erickson") and his wife, Kathleen, were in the midst 
of a divorce when two bank creditors sought foreclosure of their family farm.' Erickson retained 
attorney William Bagley ("Bagley") to file bankruptcy to stay foreclosure of Erickson's family 
farm.2 On October 8, 1998, Bagley filed a Voluntary Petition for Chapter 11 for Erickson in the 
United States Bankmptcy Court District of  omin in^.^ Just before filing the Chapter 11, 
Erickson paid Bagley a $5,000 retainer.4 Bagley had filed between five to seven Chapter 11 
bankruptcies before beginning in the 1970s and filed the most recent one two to three years 
before  rickso on's.' Bagley had filed only one Chapter 12 bankruptcy within five years before 
filing Erickson's Chapter 11 .6 
Bagley Fails To Convert From Chapter 11 To Chapter 12 
On October 21, 1998 (just 13 days after Bagley filed the Chapter Il),  the United States 
Congress reenacted Chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Code retroactive to October 1, 1998.~ Bagley 
would have initially filed Erickson's bankruptcy as a Chapter 12 if it had been available because 
Chapter 12 is preferable to a Chapter 11 for farmers and ranchers.' However, Bagley did not 
'See  William D. Bagley Depo., p. 17, LL. 19-20 in the record on appeal filed as Erickson's Exhibit E; hereafter, this 
brief will reference Exhibit E as "Bagley Depo.," followed by the applicable page and line numbers; see Tr Vol. 11, 
p. 22, LL. 7-10; the Reporter's Transcript of the 2-day trial does not contain a "Volume I" and a "Volume 11," but 
rather contains "Day I" and "Day 11." This brief will cite to "Day I" as "Vol. I" and will cite to "Day II" as "Vol. II"; 
see R Vol. 11, p. 130; there are actually two Clerk's Records on appeal because this is the second time this case has 
been on appeal. This brief will refer to the "Clerk's Record On Appeal," Docket No. 32582 as "Vol. I" and will refer 
to the "Limited Clerk's Record on Appeal," Docket No. 36466-2009 as "Vol. 11." 
See Bagley Depo., p. 17, LL. 19-20; see R Vol. 11, p. 130. 
S e e  Erickson Exhibit A-I; see R Vol. 11, p. 130. 
"ee Erickson Exhibit A-3; see Bagley Depo., p. 13, L. 25 through p. 14, L. 3 ;  see Tr Vol. 11, p. 21, LL. 6-7; p. 92, - .  . . ~ ~ 
LL. 6-17. 
' s e e  Bagley Depo., p. 8, LL. 12-24; p. 9, LL. 20-21; see Tr. Vol. 11, p. 57, L. 22 through p. 58, L. 10. 
6 See Bagley Depo., p. 7, LL. 4-6; p. 8, LL. 6-9; see Tr. Vol. 11, p. 58, LL. 4-10. 
'See  l l U.S.C. Chapter 12 legislative history and comments. See Tr Vol. I, p. 44, LL. 2-24; p. 46, LL. 17-24; p. 47, 
LL. 8-16. 
' s e e  Bagley Depo., p. 7, LL. 7-16; p. 41, L. 20 throughp. 42, L. 11. 
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know that Congress had reenacted Chapter 1 2 ~  and therefore never considered converting the 
Chapter 11 to a Chapter 12 until after the Chapter 11 was dismissed in May 1999." In fact, 
Bagley never even knew that the Chapter 11 could have been converted to a Chapter 12" even 
though it would have been fairly easy for Bagley to convert from Chapter 11 to Chapter 12.12 
Motion for Use of Cash Collateral 
On November 9,1998, Bagley filed a "MOTION FOR USE OF CASH COLLATERAL 
$363" to obtain money from the bankruptcy estate so that Erickson could pay for the daily 
farmtranch operating expenses.13 Although Bagley made the motion over a month after filing the 
petition, Bagley admitted he should have filed the motion within days after filing the petition 
since Erickson was without cash to operate until the court granted some use of cash collateral.14 
Rather than request use of cash collateral for a temporary period before plan confirmation, 
Bagley requested use of cash collateral from October 1998 through September 1999." Bagley 
also requested $167,205 in cash collateral.16 
On November 19, 1998, the court entered an "EMERGENCY ORDER AUTHORIZING 
LIMITED USE OF CASH COLLATERAL" authorizing $23,850 use of cash collateral "to pay 
identified emergency post petition debts due . . . in October, November and December of 
1998."17 On November 20, 1998, the court entered the "NOTICE OF FINAL HEARTNG" on the 
motion for use of cash collateral to be held on December 22, 1998.18 But on December 18, 1998, 
See Bagley Depo., p. 42, LL. 12-23. 
lo See Bagley Depo., p. 47, LL. 5-8. 
" See Bagley Depo., p. 42, LL. 12-24; see Tr Vol. 11, p. 101, LL. 15-20. 
'' See Tr Vol. I, p. 49, LL. 12-24; p. 51, LL. 6-1 1. 
" See Erickson Exhibit A-6. 
l4 See Bagley Depo., p. 94, L. 17 through p. 95, L. 2; p. 129, L. 20 through p. 130, L. 12: see Tr Vol. I ,  p. 83, LL. 14- 
7n "". 
'*See Erickson Exhibit A-6; see Bagley Depo., p. 102, LL. 2-20; see Tr Vol. I, p. 83, L. 25 through p. 84, L. 20; 
l6 See Erickson Exhibit A-6; see Bagley Depo., p. 102, LL. 2-20; see Tr Vol. I, p. 89, L. 11 through p. 90, L. I .  
"See Erickson Exhibit A-20; see Bagley Depo., p. 133, L. 8 through p. 134, L. 14. 
See Erickson Exhibit A-21. 
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Bagley filed a "REQUEST TO CANCEL HEARING to vacate the December 22,1998 final 
hearing because Bagley thought Erickson needed "only a nominal amount of additional cash 
collateral" and Erickson was "in the process of preparing a plan to be considered by the Creditors 
and the Court in early 1999."'~ On December 21, 1998, the court entered an Order canceling the 
hearing.'' Bagley never filed another motion for use of cash collateral which left Erickson 
without any money to pay the daily fadranch operating expenses from January 1, 1999 until 
the bankruptcy was dismissed on May 12, 1999." 
Bagley requested to use cash collateral to make payments to Erickson's mother who was 
an unsecured ~reditor?~ Bagley's motion also requested to use cash collateral to make payments 
to secured creditors rather than payments for daily operating expenses.23 Bagley proposed 
paying secured creditor John Deere $7,500 without making payments to other secured creditors 
because Erickson "loved his tractor" and wanted to keep itF4 Bagley thought that Erickson could 
prefer payments to unsecured creditors (like Erickson's mother and John Deere) over other 
secured creditors without raising the ire of the other secured creditors who were not getting 
paid.25 
Moflon To Join Kathleen AsA Co-Debtor 
On December 14, 1998, Bagley began representing Kathleen and Erickson at the same 
time and filed a "MOTION TO JOIN" on behalf of Kathleen, while their divorce was pending, to 
join Kathleen as co-debtor in Erickson's Chapter 11.'~ Bagley admitted that this motion to join 
l 9  See Erickson Exhibit A-3 1; see Bagley Depo., p. 147, L. 25 through p. 148, L. 22. 
*'See Erickson Exhibit A-34. 
21 See Tr Vol. I, p. 96, L. 12 through p. 98, L. 2; p. 102, L. 20 thorugh p. 103, L. 5. 
22 See Erickson Exhibit A-6; see Bagley Depo., p. 116, LL. 13-23; see Tr Vol. I, p. 86, L. 19 through p. 87, L. 25. 
23 See Erickson Exhibit A-6; see Bagley Depo., p. 109, L. 12 through p. 110, L. 5; see TI Vol. I, p. 84, L. 2 1 through 
86 L. 18; p. 88, L. 1 throughp. 89, L. 10. 
'SeeBagley Depo.,p. 109, L. 12 throughp. 110, L. 5; p. 110, L. 22 throughp. 111, L. 5. 
25 See Bagley Depo., p. 110, LL. 6-13. 
26 See Erickson Exhibit A-35. 
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Kathleen had no basis in law or citation to any authority.27 Predictably, the bankruptcy court 
denied the motion.28 Bagley billed Erickson for the time he spent making this unsuccessful 
motion to join ~athleen. '~  
Bagiey's conduct attempting to join Kathleen in Erickson's Chapter 11 did not meet the 
standard of care because he should have "jointly administered" the two cases and not sought to 
join ~athleen.~'  Moreover, Bagley could have obtained a joint stay without filing a petition for 
Kathleen if Bagley would have converted to a Chapter 12 because Chapter 12 contains a special 
provision not contained in Chapter 11 that provides for an automatic stay for a co-debt~r.~' 
On February 19, 1999, Bagley filed a separate Voluntary Petition for Chapter 11 
Bankruptcy for Kathleen in the United States Bankruptcy Court District of Wyoming while the 
divorce was still pending.32 Bagley has admitted that "there might be a potential conflict" and 
has said, "I could see maybe there is a potential conflict" in representing both Erickson and 
Kathleen in bankruptcy while they had a pending divorce.33 Bagley has admitted, "they would 
have had a divergent interest in preserving the property, maybe one says don't preserve it and the 
other says do preserve it."34 Erickson wanted to save his farm and continue to farm it whereas 
Kathleen wanted to sell the farm and divide the cash.35 Bagley never disclosed to Erickson that 
there was at least a potential conflict of interest in his representing both Erickson and ~ a t h l e e n . ~ ~  
Moreover, during the time of concurrently representing Erickson and Kathleen, Bagley 
lumped together the legal services he rendered in both bankruptcies and billed them only to 
27 See Bagley Depo., p. 149, LL. 4-23. 
28 See Erickson Exhibit A-37. 
29 See Tr Vol. 11, p. 109, LL. 3-8. 
See Tr Vol. I, p. 66, L. 15 through p. 67, L. 2; p. 67, LL. 11-25; p. 69, LL. 
" SeeTrVol. I, p.71:5-73:9;see 1 1  USC $ 1201. 
32 See Erickson Exhibit B-1. 
"See Bagley Depo., p. 16, LL. 4-7. 
34 See Bagley Depo., p. 16, LL. 8-13. 
'"ee Tr Vol. 11, p. 22, LL. 11-21; see Bagley Depo., p. 17, L. 10 through p. 
'6  See Bagley Depo., p. 163, L. 21 through p. 164, L. 3; see Tr Vol. 11, p. 29, 
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 rickso on.^' Bagley has testified, "I didn't distinguish between time spent for her and time spent 
for him38. . . I applied it [Erickson's $5,000 retainer] towards the endeavor. I didn't separate the 
billing, and the billing after she came on board just accrued, the $5,000 was used up fairly 
early."39 Bagley never billed Kathleen for the services he provided her.40 
Successive Applications To Employ Professionals 
On December 8, 1998, Bagley filed three applications to retain professionals, a 
"DEBTOR-IN-POSSESSION'S APPLICATION FOR ORDER ALLOWING RETENTION OF 
ACCOUNTANT," a "DEBTOR-IN-POSSESSION'S APPLICATION FOR ORDER 
ALLOWING RETENTION OF ATTORNEY," and a "DEBTOR-IN-POSSESSION'S 
APPLICATION FOR ORDER ALLOWING RETENTION OF  REALTOR."^' On December 11, 
1998, the court entered three separate orders, "ORDER REGARDING COMPLIANCE WITH 
RULES," each denying one of the three applications because they did not include verified 
statements of the person to be employed as required by law.42 
On December 21, 1998, Bagley filed a "VERIFIED STATEMENT OF ATTORNEY," and 
on December 23,1998 the court entered an "ORDER FOR DEBTOR-IN-POSSESSION TO 
RETAIN ATTORNEY," allowing retention of Bagley as attorney.43 However, after Bagley filed 
a "VERIFIED STATEMENT OF REALTOR" on December 30, 1998, the court for the second 
time entered two orders on January 4, 1999 denying both of the applications for retention of the 
accountant and the realtor due to non-compliance with the December 11, 1998 0rder.4~ 
37 See Bagley Depo., p. 11, L. 14 through p. 14, L. 9. 
38See Bagley Depo., p. 12, LL. 23-24. 
39 See Bagley Depo., p. 12, LL. 12-16. 
40 See Bagley Depo., p. 18, LL. 9-16; seeTr Vol. 11, p. 105, LL. 2-5. 
See Erickson Exhibits A-24 through 26. 
"See Erickson Exhibits A-28 through 30. 
43 See Erickson Exhibits A-33, A-36. 
"See Erickson Exhibits A-40 through 42. 
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On February 19, 1999, Bagley once again filed a "DEBTOR-IN-POSSESSION'S 
APPLICATION FOR ORDER ALLOWING RETENTION OF ACCOUNTANT" accompanied 
by a "VERIFIED STATEMENT OF ACCOUNTANT," and a "DEBTOR-IN-POSSESSION'S 
APPLICATION FOR ORDER ALLOWING RETENTION OF REALTOR" accompanied by a 
"VERIFIED STATEMENT OF  REALTOR."^' For the third time, on February 23, 1999, the 
court entered an "ORDER REGARDING COMPLIANCE WITH RULES," denying these two 
applications and emphasizing the lack of compliance with the "provisions of Fed. R. Bankr. P. 
2014" and for not setting forth "the person's connection with * * * the United States trustee, or -
any person employed in the office of the United States trustee."46 
On March 1 1, 1999, Bagley filed a "VERIFIED STATEMENT OF ACCOUNTANT," and 
on March 16,1999 Bagley filed a "VERIFIED STATEMENT OF  REALTOR."^^ The court 
subsequently entered the "ORDER FOR DEBTOR-IN-POSSESSION TO RETAIN 
ACCOUNTANT" and the "ORDER FOR DEBTOR-IN-POSSESSION TO RETAIN 
REALTOR on March 16, 1999 and March 17, 1999, respectively, over 98 days after filing the 
initial applications.48 
Bagley Claims He Voluntarily Dismissed The Chapter 11 
Bagley has testified that he "voluntarily dismissed" Erickson's Chapter 1 for the 
following reasons: 
* Bagley wanted to end the "misery" of "accounting and procedures, court 
involvement, costs, ongoing costs for court and trustee fees and other things that 
were not necessary" and it was "not going anywhere";50 
45 See Erickson Exhibits A-46 through 49. 
46 See Erickson Exhibit A-50 (with original emphasis). 
47 See Erickson Exhibits A-56 through 57. 
See Erickson Exhibits A-58, A-60. 
49SeeBagley Depo., p. 26, LL. 13-21;p.27, L. 24 -p .  28, L. 2; p. 28, LL. 12-15. 
"See Bagley Depo., p. 26, L. 22 throughp. 27, L. 9; p. 28, L. 22 -p. 29, L. 4; p. 29, LL. 12-16; p. 31, LL. 16-19. 
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* Bagley "thought we could work with the creditors" outside of bankruptcy;5' 
Bagley "thought maybe that we could get some roperty sold after it was 
dismissed and deal with the creditors that way"; Pz 
Bagley thought "[ilt was seemingly more possible outside than in" bankruptcy;53 
Working with the creditors outside of bankruptcy would save "in attorney fees 
and continuing 
"Bryce would no longer be incurring attorneys fees" because "maybe some 
property would sell and it would get over with, the debts would be paid and we 
would live happily ever after'"55 
"It wouldn't work, it was a squarepeg in a round hole";56 
The bankruptcy "had ceased to serve the purpose" because "the foreclosures were 
ended";57 
"[Dlealing with the court requirements, which are extensive," were "not 
productive";58 
"It would have been impossible to get a plan confirmed in two cases, at least it 
seemed impossible and it was not getting us anywhere";59 
Getting both plans confirmed couldn't be done since it was just too difficult to do 
and too expensive, and "[tlhe working out of two files . . . was less desirable than 
working outside of bankruptcy court";60 
Bagley could see that it was not going to be possible to get a plan confirmed for 
Erickson in the Chapter 11 because Kathleen could not be j~ ined ;~ '  
Bagley felt "[tlhe bankruptcy at that point was just not as necessary";62 
Having two separate cases was "at best awkward";63 
See Bagley Depo., p. 27, LL. 10-13. 
' I  See Bagley Depo., p. 49, L. 17 through p. 50, L. 4. 
53  See Bagley Depo., p. 50, L. 21 through p. 51, L. 3. 
5 4 ~ e e  Bagley Depo., p. 27, LL. 14-17; p. 31, L. 20 through p. 32, L. 1. 
5' See Bagley Depo., p. 32, LL. 2-7 (emphasis added). 
56 See Bagley Depo., p. 47, L. 9 through p. 48, L. 2 (emphasis added). 
57 See Bagley Depo., p. 29, LL. 5-1 1. 
58 See Bagley Depo., p. 40, LL. 4-15. 
59 See Bagley Depo., p. 40, LL. 16-21. 
60 See Bagtey Depo., p. 51, LL. 12-18. 
6'See Bagley Depo., p. 171, LL. 18-23. 
62See Bagley Depo., p. 51, LL. 4-11. 
See Bagley Depo., p. 25, LL. 20-25. 
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* Bagley did not get the Chapter 11 "shaped 
* "It's always more desirable to be able to accomplish something out of court than 
in ~ourt";6~ 
* Bagley thought "we had established some dialogue with the  creditor^";^^ 
* Bagley thought "[tlhere was some property that was being sold and about to be 
sold, could be s0ld";6~ and 
* Bagley thought "[tlhere were scenarios that we could deal with that didn't involve 
the court, and adding that to the complication of dealing through the court in that 
particular configuration, the desirability of dealing with it on the outside 
impractical aspects of dealing with it on the inside of the court 
In short, Bagley has clearly and unequivocally testified that "ultimately we weren't thrown out of 
court," but rather, Bagley "voluntarily dismissed" the Chapter 11 for his stated host of reasons.69 
Court Involuntarily Dismisses Chapter I1  For Failure To Prosecute 
On March 3, 1999, the United States Trustee filed its "UNITED STATES TRUSTEE'S 
MOTION TO  DISMISS."^^ The motion claimed that the debtor had filed for Chapter 11 on 
October 8, 1998, but had not filed a plan and a disclosure statement and had made little progress 
in advancing the case to ~onfirmation;~' the case did not involve any complicated issues of law 
or fact which prevented the debtor from filing a plan and a disclosure statement and prosecuting 
them to confirmati~n;~~ the debtor had made the unsuccessful motion to join ~ a t h l e e n ; ~ ~  Bagley 
had not provided disclosure to the court that he had begun to represent Kathleen while 
"See Bagley Depo., p. 174, LL. 1-7. 
See Bagley Depo., p. 52, LL. 13-14. 
66 See Bagley Depo., p. 52, LL. 15 
67 See Bagley Depo., p. 52, LL. 16-18. 
See Bagley Depo., p. 52, LL. 18-23. 
6 9 ~ e e ~ a g l e y  Depo.,p. 181, LL. 11-17. 
70 See Erickson Exhibit A-52; see Bagley Depo., p. 150, L. 21 through p. 151, L. 3. 
" See Erickson Exhibit A-52; see Bagley Depo., p. 151, LL. 4-6. 
"See Erickson Exhibit A-52; see Bagley Depo., p. 151, LL. 11-16. 
73 See Erickson Exhibit A-52; see Bagley Depo., p. 152, LL. 4-1 1. 
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concurrently representing Erickson during the pendency of their divorce;74 Bagley had delayed 
the administration of the bankruptcy by not taking the steps to retain a real estate broker;75 and 
did not file complete monthly financial reports since they did not contain the Form 2-B, a 
balance sheet, profit and loss statement, supporting schedules, narrative, and bank  statement^.^^ 
On March 16, 1999, First National Bank filed a "JOINDER IN MOTION TO DISMISS" 
to join in the United States Trustee's motion.77 The motion claimed that Bagley had spoken to 
counsel for the bank in December 1998 regarding a draft disclosure statement and never further 
contacted counsel for the bank or served any plan or disclosure statemenC7' the plan and 
disclosure statement were not filed within 120-days of filing the petition;79 the debtor had never 
reported on or accounted for his use of any cash coil at era^;'^ there was no apparent progress 
towards the filing of a confirmable plan;81 and the debtor was sitting back and enjoying the 
protection of the automatic stay without making a serious effort to prosecute the case." 
On March 17, 1999, First Security Bank filed its "JOINDER IN MOTION OF OFFICE 
OF UNITED STATES TRUSTEE TO DISMISS CHAPTER 11  CASE."'^ The motion claimed 
that since filing his case, the debtor's only substantive action consisted of a motion to use cash 
collateral, which was granted but only to a limited extent;84 the debtor had been delinquent in 
paying fees to the U.S. Trustee's office and in filing financial reports;85 the financial reports that 
had been filed omitted the majority of information which was meaningful to creditors in 
7"ee Erickson ExhibitA.52; see Bagley Depo., p. 153, L. 16 through p. 154, L. 12. 
75 See Erickson Exhibit A-52; see Bagley Depo., p. 154, L. 13 through p. 155, L. 17. 
76 See Erickson Exhibit A-52; see Bagley Depo., p. 155, L. 18 through p. 156, L. 1. 
77 See Erickson Exhibit A.59. 
78See Erickson Exhibit A-59. 
79 See Erickson Exhibit A.59; see Bagley Depo., p. 170, LL. 12-16. 
See Erickson Exhibit A.59; see Bagley Depo., p. 170, L. 17 through p. 171, L. 6. 
" See Erickson Exhibit A-59; see Bagley Depo., p. 172, L. 18 through p. 173, L. 5. 
82 See Erickson Exhibit A-59. 
83 See Erickson Exhibit A.61. 
"See Erickson Exhibit A-61: see Bdgley Depo., p. 174, LL. 14-19. 
"See Erickson Exhibit A-61; see Bagley Depo., p. 174, LL. 20-23. 
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assessing the debtor's prospects of reorganization, like balance sheets and profit and loss 
statements;@ the debtor's deadline for filing his plan had expired;87 Bagley had made no contact 
or communications regarding the plan or disclosure statement since December 1 9 9 8 ; ~ ~  dismissal 
was warranted under 11 USC Section 11 12(b), for cause, including inability to effectuate a plan, 
unreasonable delay by the debtor which is prejudicial to creditors, failure to prosecute a plan 
within any time fixed by the court or statute, and failure to pay quarterly fees to the U.S. 
~ r u s t e e . ~ ~  
On April 1, 1999, the court entered an "ORDER RULING ON MOTIONS AND 
REQUIRING ACTION in which the court ordered that the "debtors shall file original, signed 
disclosure statements and plans of reorganization in each case and as separate documents, at 
which time the court will set the disclosure statements for hearing." 90 Bagley says that this order 
"tells me that I am doing too good of a job of getting Bryce time."91 
On April 14, 1999, the court entered its first "ORDER ON THE UNITED STATES 
TRUSTEE'S MOTION TO DISMISS" in which the court stated that "[tlhe following matters 
need to be addressed by the debtor within ten days from the date of the hearing: 
1. The debtor shall file amended monthly financial reports and a monthly financial 
report for March 1999 which are in compliance with the operating guidelines of 
the Untied States Trustee; 
2. Mr. Bagley shall file a supplemental application to employ which provides 
complete disclosure about his representation of Kathleen Erickson in Case 
~ u k b e r  99-20162; and 
3. The debtor shall provide proof of in~urance."~~ 
See Erickson Exhibit A-61; see Bagley Depo., p. 176, LL. 5-11. 
87 See Erickson Exhibit A-61. 
88See Erickson Exhibit A-61; see Bagley Depo., p. 176, L. 25 through p. 177, L. 20. 
89 See Erickson Exhibit A-61; see Bagley Depo., p. 178, LL. 9-11. 
9 0 ~ e e  Erickson Exhibit A-69. 
9'See Bagley Depo., p. 182, LL. 8-13. 
92 See Erickson Exhibit A-74. 
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On May 12,1999, the court entered its second "ORDER ON THE UNITED STATES 
TRUSTEE'S MOTION TO DISMISS" in which the court ruled that "[ulpon consideration of the 
statements of counsel and a review of the materials on file and in accordance with oral findings 
made of record, the Court finds that there is sufficient cause for dismissal of this case pursuant to 
11 U.S.C. Section 11 12(b). ORDERED that this case is dismi~sed."~~ 
Bagley Continues Representing Erickson Afer Dismissal 
After the dismissal of Erickson's Chapter 11, Bagley continued to represent Erickson 
billing him $4,323.57 from June 3, 1999 through October 27, 1 9 9 9 . ~ ~  During this time, Bagley 
spent time and billed for trying to work out creditor claims and preparing and organizing to file a 
Chapter 12 petition for   ricks on?^ Bagley cannot differentiate between the time he spent 
preparing the Chapter 12 petition and other work that he was doing for   ricks on.^^ 
Bagley Has Erickson Sign A Promissory Note And Mortgage 
On November 13, 1999, Bagley had Erickson sign a "PROMISSORY NOTE" payable to 
Sirius LC, a company owned exclusively by Bagley and his wife, and "REAL ESTATE 
MORTGAGE," with Sirius LC as mortgagee, to secure payment of Bagley's attorney's fees and 
costs incurred from October 8, 1998 through November 13, 1999 in the amount of $29,1 73.38.97 
Because the amount of the note does not include the $5,000 Erickson paid initially upon the 
9 3 ~ e e  Erickson Exhibit A-87. 
9 9 e e  Erickson Exhibits C-51 through 57; see Tr Vol. 11, p. 95, L. 23 through p. 96, L. 24. 
95 See Bagley Depo., p. 79, L. 13 through p. 81, L. 1; see Erickson Exhibits C-51 through 59, C-81 through 83, C-86 
through C-88, C-97through 99. 
9 6 ~ e e  Bagiey Depo., p. 81, LL. 7-14. 
9 7 ~ e e  Sirius Exhibits 1-2; see Bagtey Depo., p. 18, L. 24 through p. 19, L. 6; p. 20, LL. 15-20; see R Vol. 11, pp. 130- 
1 7 1 ~  
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filing of the Chapter 11, Bagley actually charged Erickson $34,173.38 for attorney's fees from 
October 8, 1998 through November 13, 1 9 9 9 . ~ ~  
The "REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE" Erickson signed was for his family farm, which 
consisted of 172.35 acres.99 This property is known as the "Deer Creek Property" with a stated 
value on December 9, 1998 of $688,000 and a stated value on December 3, 1999 of $602,000.'~~ 
Before Erickson signed the note and mortgage, Bagley never gave Erickson a reasonable 
opportunity to seek the advice of independent legal counsel regarding signing the note and 
mortgage.lO' Before he signed the note and mortgage, Erickson did not sign a writing consenting 
to the terms of the transaction that Bagley had fully disclosed to Erickson in writing.'02 
Bagley is unable to provide any records, itemizations, or billings documenting how he 
charged for services performed for the time period between October 1998 (when Bagley first 
started representing Erickson) and May 12, 1999 (bankruptcy dismissa1.)lo3 Bagley has no way 
to show what services he provided during this time.lo4 Bagley has no accounting or breakdown 
for what he charged to arrive at any figure let alone the amount in the promissory note.''' This 
means Bagley has no accounting to show how much of the note is for costs as opposed to 
attorney's fees.lo6 In fact, Bagley says it is "improbable" that he could even recreate the billing 
for the work he performed for his services.lo7 
" See Bagley Depo., p. 20, L. 25 through p. 21, L. 14; see Tr Val. 11, p. 92, LL. 6-16. 
99 See Sirius Exhibit 2. 
loo  See Erickson Exhibits A-27, D-30. 
''I See Tr Vol. 11, p. 81, L. 18 through p. 82, L. 18. 
'''See Tr Vol. 11, p. 82, L. 19 through p. 84, L. 16. 
'''See Tr Vol. 11, p. 92, L. 21 through p. 93, L. 15. 
See Bagley Depo., p. 70, LL. 15-19. 
'''See Bagley Depo., p. 70, LL. 20-25. 
'06 See Tr Vol. 11, p. 91, LL. 7-20. 
'''See Bagley Depo., p. 70, L. 25 through p. 71, L. 2. 
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Bagley's post-dismissal billing records that do exist (that include a prior balance through 
dismissal) total about $900 less than the stated amount of the promissory note, and Bagley has no 
explanation for the discrepancy stating, "I don't know where I got the figure for the note."108 
Moreover, Bagley testified that the note reflected a charge of $165 per hour for services he 
provided during the Chapter 11 .Io9 However, Bagley's disclosure of compensation filed in the 
Chapter 11 on October 8, 1998 and verified statement of attorney filed December 21, 1998 state 
that Bagley was to charge only $140 per hour for his  service^."^ 
Furthermore, the "UNITED STATES TRUSTEE'S STATUS REPORT" dated April 19, 
1999 refers to a March 1999 monthly financial report and states that "[tlhe debtor states on the 
report that Mr. Bagley is owed $7,000 in fees over the retainer.""' This statement is attributable 
to Bagley who prepared the March 1999 report him~elf."~ The import of this statement is that 
$7,000 plus the original $5,000 retainer equals $12,000 in fees through March 1999 for a case 
dismissed in May 1999. Since Bagley's post dismissal billing statements show a previous 
balance before June 3, 1999 of $23,668.57,'13 Bagley must have billed $11,668.57 for services 
for April 1999, May 1999, and the first two days in June 1999. However, Bagley provided no 
evidence at trial explaining what services he performed during this time although whatever he 
did resulted in a dismissal for failure to prosecute. 
Chapter 12 Bankruptcy Court Disqualifies Bagley From Representing Erickson 
On December 3, 1999, Bagley filed a Voluntary Petition for Chapter 12 Bankruptcy for 
Erickson in the United States Bankruptcy Court District of Wyoming and a "DEBTOR-IN- 
Io8 See TI Vol. 11, p. 96, L. 25 through p. 97, L. 16. 
lo9 See Bagley Depo., p. 22, L. 24 through p. 23, L. 5; see also Erickson Exhibits C-51 through 57. 
'lo See Erickson Exhibit A-3, A-33. 
"' See Erickson Exhibit A-82, p. 3 (emphasis added). 
See Tr Vol. 11, p. 127, LL. 7-10. 
"3 See Erickson Exhibit C-5 1. 
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POSSESSION'S APPLICATION FOR ORDER ALLOWING RETENTION OF ATTORNEY" 
seeking court approval to retain himself as attorney for  rickso on."^ This application makes no 
mention of Bagley being a listed as a creditor of Erickson's estate by virtue of the Sirius 
promissory note and mortgage."' On December 15,1999, the court entered an "ORDER 
REGARDING COMPLIANCE WITH RULES" denying the application for failure to comply 
with Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2014 that required an accompanying verified statement of the person to be 
emp10yed.l'~ (This was the very same noncompliance problem with the successive applications 
in the Chapter 11.) On December 29, 1999, Bagley refiled the "DEBTOR-IN-POSSESSION'S 
APPLICATION FOR ORDER ALLOWING RETENTION OF ATTORNEY" (without an 
accompanying affidavit) to retain himself as an attorney and this time disclosed that "William D. 
Bagley is a listed creditor of the estate in the amount of $29,175, which debt is secured by a third 
mortgage on 172  acre^.""^ This second application further states that "[hle, as the attorney 
sought to be retained herein, bears no known interest adverse to the debtor [or], creditors. . . . ,, 118 
Eventually, the court discovered that Bagley was indeed a creditor and disqualified him 
explaining, "[oln January 3,2000, the court inadvertently entered the order authorizing 
employment of Mr. Bagley, even though counsel had not filed the requisite and proper affidavit 
and disclosure ~tatement.""~ The court's later review of the file reflected that Bagley was a 
secured creditor by virtue of the note and mortgage with ~ i r i u s . ' ~ ~  "The court ordered the debtor 
to file a statement regarding the nature of Mr. Bagley's relationship to Sirius, LC. The debtor did 
not comply. Not until a hearing held May 24,2000, did the court realize its error in authorizing 
l i d  See Erickson Exhibits D-20, D-48. 
See Erickson Exhibit D-48. 
Ii6see Erickson Exhibit D-51. 
Ii7see Erickson Exhibit D-53. 
See Erickson Exhibit D-53. 
"9 See Erickson Exhibit D-156, D-7. 
I z0  See Erickson Exhibit D-156. 
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Mr. Bagley's employment."12' Accordingly, on June 6,2000 the court entered the "ORDER 
RESCINDING ORDER FOR DEBTOR IN POSSESSION TO RETAIN ATTORNEY,'! 
disqualifying Bagley from representing Erickson, and concluding that "counsel cannot hold an 
interest adverse to the estate," "Mr. Bagley is a creditor," and "[tlhe security interest in estate 
property [i.e., the promissory note and mortgage in this case] could possibly be a preferential 
transfer."122 Thus, Bagley's attorney-client relationship with Erickson in the Chapter 12 came to 
an end on June 6,2000 even though Bagley's billing records show he continued to represent 
Erickson until August 28, 2000 . '~~  
Bagley never disclosed to Erickson his conflict of interest that existed and that ultimately 
disqualified him from the Chapter 12 proceedings.124 Bagley testified he did not have a conflict 
of interest; that he "[was] accomplishing for [Erickson] what any attorney would be able to do . . 
. with or without [a conflict];" and that Bagley discovered the "conflict" only after the 
bankruptcy court disqualified him.125 Even now, Bagley's perception is that the court 
disqualified him on the pretext of a creditor-attorney conflict.lZ6 Bagley has testified that "the 
judge was happy to see me go . . . because I was doing too good of a job."127 
Erickson Retains New Bankruptcy Counsel 
On December 20,2000, Erickson retained Judith A. Shively (hereinafter "Shively") as 
new counsel for Erickson's Chapter 12.12' Shively has been doing Chapter 12 bankruptcies for 
12 '  See Erickson Exhibit D-156 through 157. 
'22 See Erickson Exhibits D-156 through 157. 
'23 See R Vol. 11, p. 35; see Erickson Exhibit C-68. 
I2"ee Bagley Depo., p. 84, LL. 12-17; p. 87, L. 19 through p. 88, L. 20; see TI Vol. 11, p. 27, L. 24 through p. 28, L. 
3; p. 28, L. 25 through p. 29, L. 2; p. 121, L. 18 through p. 122, L. 7. 
SeeBagley Depo., p. 57, L. 14 through p. 58, L. 6; p. 86, L. 15 through p. 87, L. 18; see Tr Vol. 11, p. 121, LL. 
11-17. 
126 See Bagley Depo., p. 61, L. 5 through p. 63, L. 6. 
127 See Bagley Depo., p. 61, L. 20 through p. 63, L. 1. 
12* See Erickson Exhibit D-8, docket 73. 
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over twenty years and has successfully completed between 25-30 Chapter 12 bankruptcies.'29 
Shively has successfully completed 15-20 Chapter 11 bankruptcies for farmers.'30 On June 4, 
2001, Erickson's Chapter 12 plan was ~onfirmed.'~' On August 30,2006, Erickson received a 
discharge after completion of the Chapter 12 plan."132 
Bagley 's Conduct Below The Standard Of Care 
At trial, the judge stated "[Shively] is competent. I am impressed with her background 
and her abi~ities,"'~~ and "Ms. Shively impresses me with her knowledge of the code and her 
ability to file Shively testified that Bagley's conductin representing Erickson 
fell below the standard of care in the following respects: 
* Failing to have the information that Chapter 12 had been reenacted and then 
failing to convert from a Chapter 1 1  to a Chapter 12;'~' 
* Attempting to join Kathleen to Erickson's Chapter 1 1  rather making a motion to 
jointly administer under two separate proceedings;'36 
* Letting the exclusivity period run, not having filed a plan or disclosure statement 
before it ran, and then filing for joint administration after it ran;137 
* Filing the Motion for Use of Cash Collateral over a month after the Chapter 1 1  
petition was filed instead of within ten days of filing the petition, requesting cash 
collateral for an unreasonable amount of time, requesting to use cash collateral in 
an incorrect way, requesting such a high amount for cash collateral, not 
addressing the adequate protection issue, not communicating with the secured 
creditors regarding cash ~ol la teral ; '~~ requesting to use post petition wages in the 
motion for use of cash co~lateral; '~~ vacating the final hearing on the motion for 
129~eeTr  Vol. I ,  p. 29, LL. 10-13. 
130 See Tr Vol. I ,  p. 30, L. 20 through p. 3 1, L. 3. 
13' See Erickson Exhibit D-10, docket 98. 
See Erickson Exhibit F. 
133 See Tr Vol. I ,  p. 128, LL. 6-7. 
134 See Tr Vol. I ,  p. 164, LL. 7-8. 
SeeTr Vol. I, p. 44, LL. 2-24; p. 46:, LL. 17-24; p. 47, LL. 8-16; p. 64, LL. 14-17. 
'j6see Tr Vol. I ,  p. 66, L. 15 throughp. 67, L.-25; p. 69, LL. 11-13. 
137 See Tr Vol. I ,  p. 75, L. 20  through p. 76, L. 14. 
1 3 8 ~ e e ~ r ~ o l .  I, p. 82, LL. 15-19; p. 83, LL. 10-20; p. 84, L. 15-18; p. 85, LL. 4-13; p. 86, L. 12through p. 87, L. 23; 
p. 88, LL. 19-25; p. 89, L. 18 through p. 90, L. 1; p. 91, LL. 13-25; p. 92, LL. 11-19. 
I" See Tr Vol. I ,  p. 103, LL. 18-20. 
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use of cash ~ol la te ra l ; '~~  and failing to file another motion for use of cash 
collateral after January 1, 1999;14' 
Appointing an accountant late on March 15, 1 9 9 9 ' ~ ~  resulting in failing to consult 
an accountant for the motion for use of cash collateral'43 and failing to consult 
with an accountant for purposes of filing a plan and  statement^;'^^ 
Delaying filing of applications for employment of professionals in accordance 
with the relevant rule;145 
Failing to include verified statements in the applications for employment of 
professionals;'46 
Failing again to comply with the relevant rule for filing applications for 
employment of professionals;147 
Failing yet again to comply with the relevant rule for filing applications for 
employment of professionals;'48 
Failing conceptually to understand a Chapter 11 and how to complete a Chapter 
11 disclosure ~ ta tement ; '~~  
Failing to file a plan or disclosure statement and making little progress in 
advancing the Chapter 11 bankruptcy to c~nfirmation; '~~ 
Delaying the administration of the Chapter 1 1;15' 
Failing to disclose to the bankruptcy court his representation of both Erickson and 
~ a t h l e e n ; ' ~ ~  
Failing to file complete monthly reports;'s3 
'" See Tr Vol. I ,  p. 96, L. 16 through p. 98, L. 2. 
14' See Tr Vol. I ,  p. 102, L. 20 through p. 103, L. 5. 
I4'See Tr Val. I, p. 93, LL. 7-15; p. 93, L. 23 through p. 94, L. 5. 
'43  See Tr Val. I ,  p. 93, L. 7 through p. 94, L. 5. 
j4"ee TI ~ o l .  I ,  p. 94, LL. 8-19; p. 95, LL. 20-21. 
'05 See Tr Vol. I ,  p. 110, LL. 19-20; see also Erickson Exhibits A-24 through 26. 
See Tr Vol. I ,  p. 11 1, LL. 18-23; see also Erickson Exhibits A-28 through 30. 
'"See Tr Vol. I ,  p. 113, LL. 4-10; see also Erickson Exhibits A-41 through 42. 
14' See Tr Vof. I, p. 114, LL. 17-24; see also Erickson Exhibit A-50. 
1 4 9 ~ e e  Tr Val. I ,  p. 62, LL. 2-5. 
'"See Tr Val. I ,  p. 124, LL. 1-9; see also Erickson Exhibit A-52. 
See Tr Val. 1,p. 125, LL. 10-16; see also Erickson Exhibit A-52. 
'"See Tr Val. I ,  p. 125, LL. 5-9; see also Erickson Exhibit A-52. 
See Tr Val. I ,  p. 126, LL. 1-3; see also Erickson Exhibit A-52. 
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* Allowing the Chapter 11 to be dismissed and not curing the deficiencies after 
getting a 10 day notice from the court;154 and 
* Representing Erickson in preparing for a Chapter 12 filing that Bagley could not 
file."' 
Even Bagley has admitted that during the Chapter 11 his only substantive action 
consisted of the motion for use of cash collateral, which was granted but only to a limited 
extent.Is6 Bagley has further admitted that he was charging Erickson for the legal work the 
bankruptcy court found to be insufficient and which ultimately resulted in the Chapter 11's 
dismissa~.''~ Bagley has admitted that at times during the Chapter 11 he was ineffi~ient."~ For 
example, Bagley admits that he was not efficient in retaining experts159 and probably should not 
charge Erickson for the successive applications to retain professionals because of 
" ine f i~ i enc~ . " '~~  Finally, even Bagley has admitted he should have filed the motion for use of 
cash collateral within days (not over one month) after filing the petition.161 
Set OffDamages 
First Security Bank ("FSB) and First National Bank ("FNB) recovered attorney's fees in 
the Chapter 12 for the work their attomeys performed in the Chapter 11 that included the work 
they did in bringing motions to dismiss the Chapter 11 .I6' Bagley testified that Erickson had to 
pay these creditors' attorney's fees for the work the creditors' attomeys did in the dismissed 
I s 4  See Tr Vol. I ,  p. 131, LL. 19-25; p. 134, LL. 1-5; see also Erickson Exhibits A-74, A-87. 
'"See Tr Vol. I ,  p. 179, LL. 10-18. 
lS6 See Bagley Depo., p. 174, LL. 14-19. 
'"see Bagley Depo., p. 187, LL. 16-18. 
see Tr Val. 11, p. 122, LL. 21-25. 
See TI Vol. 11, p. 77 LL. 7-8. 
See Bagley Depo., p. 146, LL. 15-19. 
I s '  See Bagley Depo., p. 94, L. 17 through p. 95, L. 2; see also TI Vol. I ,  p. 82, L. 10 through p. 83, L. 20. 
I6'See Tr Vol. I ,  p. 190, L. 16 through p. 192, L. 1; p. 193, L. 13 through p. 194, L. 18; p. 197, L. 13 through p. 198, 
L. 9. 
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Chapter 11 Because Erickson could not locate the attorney billings for trial, Shively offered 
expert testimony based on her review of the work the attorneys for the bank performed that FSB 
incurred and recovered conservatively $9,750 in attorney's fees'64 and that FNB incurred and 
recovered conservatively $8,500 in attorney's fees.165 Additionally, on November 13, 1999, 
Erickson paid Bagley $3,000 that Bagley applied to pay for the services he performed in 
connection with the Chapter 12 that he could not perform because of a conflict of interest.'66 
Finally, Shively further testified that if Bagley had converted to a Chapter 12 ~ a ~ l e ~  would not 
have needed to file any bankruptcy petition for ~ a t h l e e n ' ~ ~  thus avoiding $830 for the filing fee 
for Kathleen's Chapter 11 petition.'68 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On October 2,2004, Sirius filed a "COMPLAINT FOR FORECLOSURE" in the District 
Court of the Sixth Judicial District in and for the County of The Complaint alleged 
that Erickson signed a promissory note and mortgage and that Erickson defaulted on the note.17' 
Sirius prayed for foreclosure of Erickson's mortgaged farm property.171 
On October 28,2004, Erickson filed apro se "ANSWER TO THE COMPLAINT FOR 
 FORECLOSURE."'^^ On January 3,2005, after retaining legal counsel, Erickson filed an 
"AMENDED  ANSWER."'^^ In the AMENDED ANSWER, Erickson admitted to signing the 
See Bagley Depo., p. 62, LL. 10-17; p. 63, L. 7-9; p. 64, L. 1 through p. 65, L. 4; p. 192, L. 13 throughp. 194, L. 
9. 
see ~r VOI. I, p. 193, LL. 13-19. 
I6'See Tr Vol. I, p. 197, LL. 13-24. 
lG6see Erickson Exhibit C-58; see Bagley Depo., p. 88, L. 25 through p. 89, L. 10; see Tr Vol. 11, p. 97, LL. 17-19. 
167SeeTrVol. I, p. 71, L. 5 through p. 73, L. 21; see also 11 USC 5 1201. 
16'see Erickson Exhibit B-l . 
See R Vol. I, p. 1. 
I" See R Vol. I, pp. 2-4. 
17' See R Vol. I, pp. 5-6. 
'"See R Vol. I, p. 13. 
""ee RVol. I, p.20. 
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note and the mortgage that were attached as exhibits to the ~ o m ~ 1 a i n t . l ~ ~  Furthermore, 
Erickson's AMENDED ANSWER admitted to not having paid the $29,173.38 amount of the 
note.'75 However, Erickson alleged numerous defenses, asserting, inter alia, the doctrine of set 
off, adequacy of consideration, and the note and mortgage were void and ~nenforceable."~ 
On August 23,2005, the court, sua sponte, granted summary judgment to The 
court reasoned that "[tlhere is nothing in the record to indicate any fraud, undue influence, 
misrepresentation, or any other defense alleged in [Erickson's] amended answer."'78 The court 
also denied Erickson's prior "MOTION TO COMPEL" discovery related to his defenses, which 
were the same defenses the court concluded Erickson had failed to support, deeming the 
"MOTION TO COMPEL" to be "moot."'79 On that same day, the court entered "JUDGMENT" 
in favor of ~ i r i u s . ' ~ ~  
On December 14,2005, Erickson appealed.'81 On appeal in Sirius LC v. Erickson, 144 
Idaho 38 (2007), the Supreme Court vacated the JUDGMENT and held that the district court had 
abused its discretion in denying Erickson's motion to compel production of documents pertaining 
to his affirmative defenses. Although the court found that "Erickson received consideration for 
the note, we do not opine as to the adequacy of the eon~ideration."'~~ On March 28,2007, the 
Supreme Court remanded for firther proceedings on Erickson's affirmative defenses. 
On June 6,2008, the court on remand held a hearing on pretrial motions where the court 
indicated that it would allow Bagley to testify as an expert even though the plaintiff failed to 
174 See RVol. I ,  pp. 21-22. 
17' See R Vol. I ,  p. 22. 
I7'See R Vol. I ,  pp. 22-23. 
'77 See R Vol. I ,  pp. 29 and 38. 
See R Vol. 1, p. 36. 
179 See R Vol. I ,  p. 38. 
180 See R Vol. I ,  p. 40. 
See R Vol. 1, p. 54. 
See Sirius LC v. Erickson, 144 Idaho 38,43, fn. 2 (2007) ("While we hold that Erickson received consideration 
for the note, we do not opine as to the adequacy of the consideration.") 
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disclose him as an expert in discovery and never disclosed him as an expert pursuant to the 
court's pretrial order.Is3 The court reasoned that Bagley "is a lawyer and that is the whole issue 
about this thing."lS4 
On June 13,2008, Erickson filed an "OBJECTION TO ALLOWING WILLIAM 
BAGLEY TO TESTIFY AS AN EXPERT AND A MOTION TO CONTINUE TRIAL 
 SETTING."'^^ Erickson made the objection on the grounds that the plaintiff had failed to 
disclose Bagley as an expert witness in the plaintiff's discovery responses (even though Erickson 
specifically asked for this inf~rmat ion) '~~ and failed to "disclose in writing" Bagley as an expert 
witness "together with a summary of the testimony" Bagley intended to offer, as required in the 
"ORDER FOR TRIAL, PRE-TRIAL SCHEDULE, AND PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE" dated 
August 9,2007.'~' The objection sought an order precluding Bagley from testifying as an expert 
witness or, alternatively, a continuance for Erickson to obtain in discovery Bagley's expert 
opinions and the bases thereof.Is8 
On June 23,2008, the court denied the objection and motion for a con t in~ance . '~~  The
court further overruled Erickson's objection to allowing Bagley to testify as an expert witness.lgO 
During trial, Erickson renewed his objection against allowing Bagley to testify as an expert 
witness due to failure to disclose Bagley as an expert during discovery, but the court still allowed 
Bagley to testify as an expert.191 
"'See Tr Val. 111, p. 41, L. 3 through p. 42, L. 23. This brief will refer to the Reporter's Transcript dated June 6, 
2008 as "Val. 111." 
1 8 4 ~ e e ~ r ~ o l .  111, p. 41, LL. 11-13. 
'''See R Val. 11, p. 82. 
See R Vol. 11, pp. 30-3 1. 
'"See R Val. 11, p. 83; see "ORDER FOR TRIAL, PRE-TRIAL SCHEDULE, AND PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE" 
dated August 9,2007 as a document contained in the augmented record on appeal. 
'" See R Vol. 11, pp. 82-85. 
'"See Minute Entry and Order dated June 25,2007 as a document contained in the augmented record on appeal. 
See Minute Entry and Order dated June 25,2007 as a document contained in the augmented record on appeal. 
19' See TI Vol. II., p. 6 1 LL. 9-21. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL Page 24 of 48 
F:\CLENTS\BDS\7453\Pleadings\067 appellate briefdoc 
On June 30, 2008 and June 31,2008, trial was held.'92 On the first day of trial, Erickson 
stipulated that the plaintiff had proven its case regarding the promissory note and mortgage 
subject to Erickson's affirmative defenses.'93 In other words, Erickson stipulated that he signed 
the promissory note and mortgage, that Erickson had not paid any amount on the promissory 
note, that the numbers alleged in the complaint are accurate, etc. and that the issues to be tried 
were those raised by Erickson's affirmative defenses.'94 The court accepted the stipulation, the 
plaintiff rested, and Erickson began putting on evidence addressing the affirmative defenses he 
raised.I9' 
Shivley testified that a reasonable amount of attorney's fees for the work Bagley 
performed would have been $2,227.50.'~~ She based this amount on the bankruptcy code section 
that would have applied to any fee request Bagley might have made had the court not dismissed 
the Chapter 1 1.'97 She based her opinion on her review of the entire Chapter 11 file, her 
experience in filing 10-1 5 Chapter 11 fee applications, her experience with Chapter 11 and 
Chapter 12 fee applications other attorneys have filed because the requirements are the same for 
both Chapter 11 and Chapter 12, her 22 years experience, and the value of the work Bagley 
performed and conferred as the rule requires.19* However, the court would not admit Shively's 
testimony because earlier she had testified that she does not "have specialized training in 
determining 
On September 30,2008, the trial court entered its "FINDINGS OF FACTS AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER," and it entered 
19* See Tr Vol. I and Tr Vol. 11. 
l g3  See Tr Vol. I ,  p. 5, L. 25 through p. 8, L. 6. 
I9'See Tr Vol. I ,  p. 5, L. 25 through p. 8, L. 6. 
"* See Tr Vol. I ,  p. 8, LL. 19-22. 
196 See Tr Vol. 1,  p. 199, L. 6 through p. 200, L. 4. 
"'See Tr Vol. I ,  p. 199, L. 6-20. 
I9'See Tr Vol. I ,  p. 200, L. 22 through p. 203, L. 7. 
I g 9  See Tr Vol. I ,  p. 36, LL. 18-21.(emphasis added); p. 203, LL. 8-17, 
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"JUDGMENT" again in favor of ~ i r i u s . ~ ~ ~  The court ruled that the note is valid and that 
Erickson is "obligated to pay the full amount of the note plus interest and attorney's fees as 
provided in the note and mortgage."201 After ruling that the court would not consider any of 
Erickson's affirmative defenses because they were directed against Bagley and not Sirius, who is 
the party to the the court found that (1) the legal work Bagley performed was adequate 
to support the note;'03 (2) Bagley did not have a conflict in representing Erickson and Kathleen at 
the same time;204 (3) the amount of fees Bagley charged was reasonable;205 and (4) Bagley did 
not violate Wyoming Rule of Professional Responsibility 1.8(a) because the note and mortgage 
were provided as consideration and not as a security interestzo6 "[Oltherwise, no attorney could 
enter into agreements for payment as they would be in conflict with their clients thereafter."2o7 
On October 14,2008, Erickson filed a "MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR, IN 
THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR A NEW TRIAL.*~O~ 
On April 1,2009, the trial court entered its "MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER ON ERICKSON'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR, IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE, FOR A NEW TRIAL" denying Erickson's motion.209 
On April 22,2009, Erickson filed his second "NOTICE OF  APPEAL.""^ 
20' See R Vol. 11, pp. 128 and 143. 
"' See R Vol. 11, p. 129. 
'"See R Vol. 11, pp. 133-134. 
203 See R Vol. 11, p. 134. 
'''.See RVol. 11, pp. 136-137. 
Z 0 5 ~ e e ~ ~ o l .  11, pp. 137-138. 
' " ~ e e ~  Vol. 11, pp. 137-138. 
207 See R Vol. 11, p. 138. 
'''See R Vol. 11, pp. 147, 152-194. 
"' See R VoI. 11, p. 198. 
'I0 See R Vol. 11, p. 2 10. 
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ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Is the district court's decision that Erickson cannot raise any defenses involving 
Bagley's wrongful conduct against the law? 
2. Can the plaintiff recover on the promissory note when Bagley failed to comply 
with Wyoming Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(a) that prohibits business transactions with 
clients? 
3. Does substantial evidence exist that Bagley's services were adequate 
consideration for the $29,173.38 promissory note? 
4. Did Bagley's acknowledged conflict of interest in representing Erickson in the 
Chapter 12 predate its filing so as to preclude charging a portion of the $29,173.38 in attorney's 
fees the court awarded? 
5. Did Bagley have a conflict of interest in representing Erickson and Kathleen 
together in the Chapter 1 1  so as to preclude charging a portion of the $29,173.38 in attorney's 
fees the court awarded? 
6. Did the district court commit reversible error in failing to apply $830, $9,750, 
$8,500, and $3,000 as set off damages against the $29,173.38 in attorney's fees the court 
awarded? 
7. Did the district court commit reversible error at trial by refusing to allow 
Erickson's expert witness to give her opinion regarding damages? 
8. Did the district court commit reversible error by allowing the plaintiff to offer the 
expert testimony of Bagley at trial? 
9. Is Erickson entitled to costs and attorney's fees on appeal? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION IS AGAINST THE LAW BECAUSE IT DOES 
NOT ALLOW ERICKSON TO RAISE ANY DEFENSES INVOLVING BAGLEY'S 
WRONGFUL CONDUCT. 
This case involves two parts: Sirius I occurred when the trial court sua sponte granted 
summary judgment in favor of Sirius, and Erickson successfully appealed. Sirius II refers to all 
proceedings after the Supreme Court decided Sirius LC v. Erickson, 144 Idaho 38 (2007.) In 
Sirius I, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the services Bagley performed could serve as 
consideration for the Sirius note. The Supreme Court remanded the matter for further handling 
that included determining whether the consideration was "adequate" in light of Erickson's 
affirmative defenses, which included "set off' for Bagley's malpractice. The trial court in Sirius 
II now has held that as a matter of law that "the affirmative defenses involving Mr. Bagley's 
conduct, whether wrongful or not, are not applicable here."2" This court exercises free review 
over issues of law. American Pension Services, Inc. v. Cornerstone Home Builders, LLC, 147 
Idaho 638 (2009). 
The district court is saying that the consideration, whether adequate or not, does not 
matter even though the Supreme Court vacated "the district court's grant of summary judgment 
with respect to Erickson's remaining affirmative defenses" and "remanded for further 
proceedings on those issues," which included whether "there was inadequate and insufficient 
consideration to support the agreements." Sirius LC v. Erickson, 144 Idaho 38,43, fn. 2,44 
(2007). The Supreme Court clearly stated that although "we hold that Erickson received 
consideration for the note, we do not opine as to the adequacy of the consideration" and left this 
factual determination for the trial court. Id at 43, fn. 2. 
'IL See R Vol. 11, p. 136. 
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If this Court had really thought that the sufficiency of Bagley's services was not 
"applicable" as a matter of law, then this Court would not have remanded the case to conduct 
discovery on those services and to test the adequacy of those services. Instead, this Court would 
have simply ruled as a matter of law that Erickson was not entitled to any discovery on Bagley's 
services because those services are legally irrelevant. If this Court's decision is to have any 
meaning, then the trial court's conclusion that Bagley's services are "not applicable here" is 
against the "law of the case." 
Moreover, "[aln assignment is a transfer of rights or property from one person to 
another." Foley v. Grigg, 144 Idaho 530,532 (2007). An assignee takes only those rights and 
remedies the assignor had. Id. This means that the third party to an assignment has the same 
defenses against the assignee as it had against the assignor. Id Here, Bagley "redirected" his 
account receivable to Sirius. This is in substance an assignment that gives Erickson the same 
defenses against Sirius as Erickson had against Bagley. 
The court should construe the transaction as a contract in law for an assignment for the 
purposes of bringing about justice and equity. Gray v. Tri- Way Const. Services, Inc., 147 Idaho 
378 (2009). Otherwise, a crafty lawyer could avoid the consequences of his own malpractice by 
having his client execute a promissory note to a third party entity the lawyer owns. Then after 
the two-year statute of limitations period has passed, the third party entity could sue the client for 
payment. The client could not file a counter claim because the third party entity did not provide 
the services; the client could not file a third party complaint against the lawyer because the 
statute of limitations had run; and the client could not raise the lawyer's negligence as a set off 
because the lawyer, not the third party entity, provided the consideration. This would amount to 
unassailable "super-consideration" that would deny justice and equity. 
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11. PLAINTIFF CANNOT RECOVER ON THE PROMISSORY NOTE BECAUSE 
BAGLEY VIOLATED WYOMING RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1.8(al 
THAT PROHIBITS BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS WITH CLIENTS. 
"'An attorney's freedom to contract with a client is subject to the constraints of ethical 
considerations."' Petit-Clair v. Nelson, 782 A.2d 960, 962 (N.J. Super. 2001); quotation omitted. 
"Any transaction between an attorney and client is 'subject to close scrutiny."' Id. at 962; 
quotation omitted. "An attorney in his relations with a client is bound to the highest degree of 
fidelity and good faith. The strongest influences of public policy require strict adherence to such 
a role of conduct."' Id. at 962-963; quotation omitted. "Consequently, an otherwise enforceable 
agreement between an attorney and client is invalid 'if it runs afoul of ethical rules governing 
that relationship."' Id. at 963; quotation omitted. See also ~ a l l e ~ / 5 0 ' ~    venue, L. L. C. v. Steward, 
153 P.3d 186 (Wash. 2007) ("Attorney fee agreements that violate applicable rules of 
professional conduct are against public policy and unenforceable.") 
In 1999, Wyoming followed Wyoming Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(a) that read as 
follows: 
Rule 1.8. Conflict of interest: prohibited transactions 
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly 
acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client 
unless: 
(1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest 
are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in 
writing to the client in a manner which can be reasonably understood by the 
client; 
(2) the client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advise of 
independent counsel in the transaction; and 
(3) the client consents in writing thereto. 
An attorney fee transaction in which the attorney secures payment with a promissory note 
and a security interest that violates Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(a) is void and 
unenforceable. ~alleyD0'~ Avenue, L. L. C. v. Steward, supra, 1 53 P.3d at 186 (holding that 
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lawyer's note and deed of trust securing payment of past attorney's fees are void and 
unenforceable unless lawyer stringently complies with Rule 1.8(a)); and Petit-Clair v. Nelson, 
supra, 782 A.2d at 960 (holding that note and mortgage securing attorney's fees were invalid 
where the lawyer failed to comply with Rule 1.8(a)). 
By its express term, 1.8(a) designates an offending transaction as a "prohibited 
transaction." Erickson submits that "prohibited" by law means "unlawful." An unlawful 
transaction is void. Takahashi v. Pepper Tank & Contracting Co., 13 1 P.2d 339,354-355 (Wyo. 
1942); and Hecht v. Acme Coal Co., 113 P. 788,790 (Wyo. 191 1). Whether the security 
agreement and transaction Bagley seeks to enforce through Sirius are "prohibited," "unlawful," 
and "void" because Bagley did not comply with the provisions of Rule 1.8(a) is a matter of law 
over which this court exercises free review. American Pension Services, Inc. v. Cornerstone 
Home Builders, LLC, supra, 147 Idaho at 638. 
A. Baglev Bears The Burden Of Proving Fairness, Equitv. And Comoliance With 
Rule 1.8(a). 
"'[Aln attorney-client transaction is prima facie fraudulent"' and presumptively invalid. 
~ a l l e ~ / 5 0 ' ~    venue, L. L.C. v. Steward, supra, 153 P.3d at 190; quotation omitted; P & M Enter: 
v. Murray, 680 A.2d 790, (N.J. App. Div. 1996). Consequently, "the burden of establishing 
fairness and equity of the transactions rests upon the attorney."' Petit-Clair v. Nelson, supra, 782 
A.2d at 962-963; quotation omitted. 
"The burden of proving compliance with Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8 rests with the 
lawyer." ~ a l l e ~ / 5 0 ' ~    venue, L. L.C. v. Steward, supra, 153 P.3d at 190. "[A] lawyer must prove 
strict compliance with the safeguards of Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(a); full disclosure, 
opportunity to consult outside counsel, and consent must be proved by the communications 
between the attorney and the client." Id "The disclosure which accompanies an attorney-client 
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transaction must be complete. Attorneys, to defend their actions, must prove they complied with 
the 'stringent requirements imposed upon an attorney dealing with his or her client."' Id. 
Moreover, "[tlhe burden is upon the lawyer to demonstrate that a real and meaningful 
opportunity to seek independexit counsel was afforded to the client." ~alle~/50" Avenue, L.L.C. v. 
Steward, supra, 153 P.3d at 191. "The opportunity to seek independent advice must be real and 
meaningful. It is not enough that at some moment in time an opportunity existed no matter how 
brief or fleeting that opportunity might have been." Id. at 190. 
B. Rule 1.8(a) Applies To All Security Interests And To Anv Pecuniarv Interest 
Adverse To A Client. 
By its express terms, Rule 1.8(a) applies to all "security interests" a lawyer knowingly 
acquires in his client's property. The "adverse" requirement applies only to "other pecuniary 
interests." This must be so because all security interests are necessarily "adverse" to the person 
whose property is subject to the security interest. Although the "adverse" requirement of Rule 
1.8(a) applies only to "other pecuniary interests," case law holds that a mortgage on a client's 
property given to the lawyer as security is "clearly" a security interest adverse to the client. 
Petit-Clair v. Nelson, supra, 782 A.2d at 963; In re Taylor, 741 N.E.2d 1239 (Ind. 2001); and In 
re Douglass, 859 A.2d 1069 (D.C. 2004). 
C. Rule 1 .&a) Also Applies -1'0 ,\I1 Rusiriess Pansacrions Including A I.aw\.er's 
Taking A Note And Securilv Interestxo Secure Pavment Of Past Atrom~v's Fees. 
Rule 1.8(a) also applies to all "business transactions" between a lawyer and his client. A 
lawyer who takes a security interest in his client's real property to secure payment on a note for 
payment ofpast attorney's fees engages in a "business transaction" with the client that invokes 
the protections of Rule 1.8(a). ~ a l l e ~ / 5 0 ' ~   venue, L. L.C. v. Steward, supra, 153 P.3d at 186. 
Such an agreement is not a fee agreement between a lawyer and client but in reality an 
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agreement between a creditor and debtor that rises to a "business transaction" within the meaning 
of Rule 1.8(a). Id. Here, the note and mortgage constitute a "business transaction" in addition to 
being a "security interest." 
D. Bagley Has Not Complied With The Reauirements Of Rule 1.8(a). 
The note and mortgage Bagley had Erickson sign to secure the payment of Bagley's 
attorney's fees is a security interest and "an interest in the client's property adverse to the client." 
In re Taylor, supra, 741 N.E.2d at 1242. Moreover, the note and mortgage Bagley obtained from 
Erickson was a "business transaction" within the meaning of Rule 1 &a). See Valley/50~~ Avenue, 
L.L.C. v. Steward, supra, 153 P.3d at 186. Accordingly, Bagley was required to comply with 
Rule 1.8(a) and in fact bears the burden of proof that he did comply with Rule 1.8(a). However, 
as set forth below, Bagley did not comply with the requirements of Rule 1.8(a). 
1. "A fee agreement between a lawyer and a client, revised after the relationship has 
been established on terms more favorable to the lawyer than originally agreed upon may be void 
or voidable unless the attorney shows that the contract was fair and reasonable, free from undue 
influence, and made after a fair and full disclosure of the facts on which it is predicated." 
~alley/50'~ Avenue, L. L. C. v. Steward, supra, 153 P.3d at 189. A mortgage to secure a note for 
past attorney's fees has been found to be unfair and unreasonable where it expands a client's 
liability far beyond the terms the lawyer and client originally agreed to. Petit-Clair v. Nelson, 
supra, 782 A.2d at 960. 
The transaction and terms on which Bagley acquired his interest are unfair and 
unreasonable and expand Erickson's liability far beyond the terms Erickson and Bagley 
originally agreed to. Erickson mortgaged 172.35 acres to ~ a ~ l e ~ ~ ~ ~  on the Deer Creek Property 
'" See Sirius Exhibit 2. 
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with a stated value on December 3, 1999 of $602,000.~'~ There were only two secured creditors 
other than the Sirius note on the Deer Creek Property at the time Bagley filed the Chapter 12 on 
December 3 , 1 9 9 9 . ~ ' ~  One creditor was FSB whose secured claim was $115,000, and the other 
creditor was Wyoming Farm Loan Board whose secured claim was $70,000.~'~ Using the stated 
value of $602,000 for the Deer Creek Property, Bagley obtained at least $417,000 of 
unencumbered collateral to secure a note in the amount of $29,173.38. 
Bagley's over secured position is far better for him considering the reality of the 
situation. Erickson had assigned a $97,000 receivable to FSB who was applying the $97,000 
receivable to pay off its $1 15,000 claim.216 Giving credit for this $97,000 receivable increases 
Bagley's over secured position to $514,000 on the $29,173.38 note. Even worse, the total value 
of Erickson's real property was $1.3 million in which FSB and Wyoming Farm Loan Board also 
held security for their $1 15,000 and $70,000 claims This means that once FSB 
and Wyoming Farm Loan Board were paid from the other properties sold in the Chapter 12, 
Bagley would be the lone remaining secured creditor with security valued at $602,000 for his 
$29,173.38 note thus making Bagley over secured by as much as $572,000. 
Moreover, originally Bagley had agreed to represent Erickson for $140 per hour, and the 
original agreement did not include any terms for security. The original agreement certainly did 
not include giving Bagley a security interest over-securing Bagley between $417,000 and 
$572,000. Any independent lawyer not wanting to commit malpractice would have advised 
Erickson not to pledge his entire 172 acre farm with a net equity value between $417,000 and 
2'3 See Erickson Exhibit D-30. 
'I4 See Erickson Exhibit D-36. 
"'See Erickson Exhibit D-36. 
'I6 See Erickson Exhibits D-32 and 36. 
'I7 See Erickson Exhibits D-30 and 36. 
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$572,000 to secure Bagley's $29,173.28 note. Erickson submits that such an over-secured 
position heavily in favor of Bagley is neither fair nor reasonable to Erickson. 
Finally, Bagley committed malpractice by having the Chapter 11 dismissed and failing to 
convert to a Chapter 12, represented Erickson under multiple conflicts of interest, and has no 
records to justify the amount of the note. Thus, Bagley's having Erickson sign a note for 
services he rendered under these circumstances cannot be said to be "fair and reasonable." 
2. Bagley did not fully disclose the transaction and terms in writing to Erickson at all 
let alone in a manner Erickson could reasonably understand. The only documents that contain 
the transaction and terms are the note and mortgage Erickson signed. Bagley was unable to 
identify any separate writing, as case law requires, fully disclosing the transaction and the terms 
to Erickson that he could then consent to as Rule 1.8(a) requires.''' In re Estate of Brown, 930 
A.2d 249,253 (D.C. 2007); In re Stephens, 851 N.E.2d 1256, 1258 (Ind. 2006); Lawyer 
Disciplinary Board v. Barber, 566 S.E.2d 245,251 (W.Va. 2002); and Matter of Charfoos, 183 
B.R. 131, 136-137 (Bankr.E.D. Mich. 1994.) 
3. There was no evidence that Bagley gave Erickson a reasonable opportunity to 
seek the advice of independent counsel. Although Bagley testified that Erickson had a divorce 
lawyer who included the debt to Bagley in the Marriage Settlement Agreement, there was no 
evidence that Erickson ever had the opportunity to seek the advice of the divorce lawyer with 
regard to the transaction. In fact, the Decree of Divorce was entered on October 19, 1999.'19 
But Erickson signed the promissory note and mortgage on November 13, 1999."O Therefore, by 
the time Erickson signed the promissory note and mortgage, the divorce case had been concluded 
for nearly one month. 
2'8 See TI Vol, 11. p. 82, L. 19 through p. 84, L. 6. 
2'9 See Sirius Exhibit 6. 
220 See Sirius Exhibits 1 and 2. 
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4. Erickson did not consent in writing to the terms of the transaction. The only 
written consent Bagley could point to is the Marriage Settlement Agreement the divorce lawyers 
prepared and that Erickson signed on September 14, 1999 that references in Exhibit "B" a 
secured debt to William D. Bagley for $24,000, not the actual note amount of $29,173.28.221 
Moreover, the Marriage Settlement Agreement contains none of the terms of the transaction and 
specifically does not even identify the property in which Bagley would claim a security interest 
through Sirius nor does it identify ~ i r i u s . ~ ~ ~  Simply affixing one's name to the Marriage 
Settlement Agreement that references the debt to Bagley is not "informed consent" just as merely 
signing a listing agreement is insufficient to show a client's "informed consent" in writing (In re 
Estate of Brown, supra, 930 A.2d at 249) and merely signing a check is insufficient to show a 
client's "informed consent" in writing. Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Barber, supra, 566 S.E.2d 
at 245. 
E. The Trial Court Misapplied Rule 1.8(a). 
The trial court ruled that Bagley did not violate Rule 1.8(a) because "the note and securing 
mortgage were provided as consideration and not as an adverse ownership, possessory, security or 
other pecuniary interest." Otherwise, "no attorney could enter into agreements for payment as they 
would be in conflict with their clients thereafter." Rule 1.8(a) applies when the attorney takes a 
"security interest" in the client's property to secure his fees. The attorney has also entered a 
"business transaction" because the relationship has changed from attomeylclient to creditorldebtor. 
Contrary to the court's conclusion, an attorney can enter into an agreement for payment without 
running afoul of Rule 1.8. But when the agreement involves a note and mortgage months after 
221 See Sirius Exhibit 3. 
222 See Sirius Exhibit 3. 
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representation began, the attorney obtains a "security interest" and the agreement becomes a 
"prohibited transaction" absent compliance with Rule 1.8(a), 
111. NO SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPEI'EN'I' EVIDESCE EXISTS THAI' BAGLEY'S 
SERVICES WERF ADEQUATE CONSIDERATION FOR TIIE $29.173.38 
PROMISSORY NOTE. 
"When review of a trial court's decision involves entwined questions of law and fact," the 
Supreme Court exercises "free review over questions of law" and upholds "factual findings 
supported by substantial and competent evidence." Ada County Highway Dist. v. Total Success 
Investments, LLC, 145 Idaho 360 (2008.) 
Here, the trial court made the factual finding that the legal work Bagley performed for 
Erickson was "adequate" to support the note because Bagley's attorney's fees are reasonable.223 
The court applied the rule that "[a] lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an 
unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses." Wyo. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5. Thus, 
the trial court found that Bagley provided legal services reasonably valued at $29,173.38 or the 
amount of the note. However, no substantial and competent evidence exists to support the 
court's finding. In fact, undisputed evidence exists that Bagley's attorney's fees of $29,173.38 
are unreasonable and therefore inadequate consideration for the promissory note. 
A. No Evidence Exists To Support A Finding That Bagley's Chapter 1 1  Fee Of 
$28,668.57 Is Reasonable. 
Bagley charged $28,668.57 for the work he performed in the Chapter 11. (This number is 
computed by taking the prior balance from June 3, 1998 from a post dismissal billing statement 
of $23,668.57 and adding to it the $5,000 retainer Erickson paid ~ a g l e ~ . ) ~ ~ ~  But there was no 
evidence that this amount was reasonable for the Chapter 11. In fact, Bagley did not even review 
or identify the work he performed in the Chapter 1 1  and has no attorney billings to document 
223 See Tr Vol. 11, p. 133. 
'" See Erickson Exhibit C-5 1. 
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what services he performed in the Chapter 1 Bagley can provide no itemization or show 
what he actually charged for the work in the Chapter 1 Bagley can provide no accounting 
or breakdown for what he charged to arrive at the total figure of $28,66~.57.~" Bagley cannot 
locate his billings to justify his attorney's fees for the Chapter 11 and has made no effort to 
recreate the work he performed for his services.228 Thus, there was simply no substantial and 
competent evidence to support a factual finding that $28,668.57 for the work he performed in the 
Chapter 11 was reasonable. 
To the contrary, Bagley admits that he did not perform some of his work "efficiently" as 
is the case where Bagley filed multiple unsuccessful perfunctory applications to retain 
professionals.229 Bagley further admits that it is not reasonable for him to charge Erickson for 
the successive applications to retain professions?30 But Bagley did charge for all the successive 
applications he filed in obtaining the orders to appoint professionals?31 
Furthermore, the "UNITED STATES TRUSTEE'S STATUS REPORT" dated April 19, 
1999 refers to a March 1999 monthly financial report and states that "[tlhe debtor states on the 
report that Mr. Bagley is owed $7,000 in fees over the retainer."232 This statement is attributable 
to Bagley who prepared the March 1999 report himself?33 The import of this statement is that 
$7,000 plus the original $5,000 retainer equals $12,000 in fees through March 1999 for a case 
dismissed in May 1999. Since Bagley's post dismissal billing statements show a previous 
"' See Bagley Depo., 69: 19-24. 
'"See Bagley Depo., 70:15-19. 
227 See Bagley Depo., 70:20-25. 
'" See Bagley Depo., 69:s-11. 
229 See Bagley Depo., 143:21-22. 
2 3 9 e e  Bagley Depo., 146:15-19. 
231 See Bagley Depo., 141:s-11. 
232 See Erickson Exhibit A-82, p. 3 (emphasis added). 
'" See Tr Vol. 11, p. 127, LL. 7-10. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL 
F:\CLIENTS\BDS\7453\Pleadings\O67 appellate brief doc 
Page 38 of 48 
balance before June 3, 1999 of $~3,668.57?~~ Bagley must have billed $1 1,668.57 for services 
for April 1999, May 1999, and the first two days in June 1999. However, Bagley provided no 
evidence at trial explaining what services he even performed during this time, although whatever 
he did resulted in a dismissal for failure to prosecute. 
Bagley also charged Erickson $165 per hour for the work he performed in the Chapter 
1 1.235 Yet, Bagley's application for employment, the court order:36 and Bagley's verified 
statement all say that he would charge $140 per At a minimum, Erickson would be 
entitled to a credit of $25 per hour for all the hours Bagley has charged for services performed in 
the Chapter 11 even assuming all his hours were reasonable. 
Bagley could have and should have converted the Chapter 11 to a Chapter 12. See 11 
U.S.C. Section 11 12(d). Bagley himself testified that he would have initially filed this case as a 
Chapter 12 if it had been available.238 And Bagley never considered converting to a Chapter 12 
until after the Chapter 11 was dismissed.239 Bagley never even knew that he could have 
converted the Chapter 11 to a Chapter 1 2 . ~ ~ '  Shively testified that Bagley's failure to convert 
from a Chapter 11 to a Chapter 12 under these facts was conduct below the standard of care 
because a Chapter 12 is much better for farmers and  rancher^:^' and Bagley never disputed 
Shively's testimony on this point. 
Bagley's attorney's fee of $28,668.57 for the failed Chapter 11 is unreasonable. Shively 
got the Chapter 12 plan approved, and Erickson successfully completed the plan ultimately 
receiving a Chapter 12 discharge order. This proves that if Bagley had converted to a Chapter 12 
234 See Erickson Exhibit C-5 1. 
235 See Bagley Depo., 22:24-23:5; 37:21-22:3. 
236 See Erickson Exhibits A-25 and A-36. 
237 See Erickson Exhibit A-33. 
238See Bagley Depo., 7:9-16; 41:20-42:2. 
239 See Bagley Depo., 47:5-8. 
240 See Bagley Depo., 42: 12-24. 
241 See Tr Vol. 11, p. 64, LL. 14-17. 
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and performed competently, he too could have gotten a Chapter 12 plan approved, completed the 
plan, ultimately received a discharge order-all without having to incur $28,668.57 in attorney's 
fees for a dismissed Chapter 11 caused by Bagley's failure to prosecute. In the end, Bagley 
charged Erickson $28,668.57 for a "no value Chapter 11 dismissal" when Erickson should have 
gotten a valuable Chapter 12 confirmation just like Shively got Erickson and that Erickson paid 
Shively to get. 
B. The Evidence Is Undisputed That A Portion Of Baglev's Attornev's Fees 
Supporting The Note Are For Attorney's Fees Baaley Unreasonably Charged 
While Representing. Erickson Under A Conflict Of Interest. 
"'The relationship of attorney and client is an extremely delicate and fiduciary one 
[Clourts jealously hold [the attorney] to the utmost good faith in the discharge of his duty.' 
Misconduct in violation of a statute or acts against public policy, or in breach of an attorney's 
fiduciary duty to his client, may support a complete forfeiture of fees." Crawford v. Logan, 656 
S.W.2d 360,364 (Tenn. 1983) (quotation and citation omitted); see also Simpson Performance 
Products, Inc. v. Robert JK Horn, PC., 92 P.3d 283,287 (Wyo. 2004) (forfeiture of attorney's 
fees incurred while the lawyer has a conflict of interest is appropriate); Cal Pak Delivery, Inc. v. 
United Parcel Service, Inc., 52 Cal.App.4th 1, 14 (1997) (in conflict of interest cases an attorney 
who violates ethical duties to a client is not entitled to a fee for services); In re Spanjer Bros., 
Inc., 191 B.R. 738 (Bkrtcy.N.D.111. 1996) (if a debtor's attorney does not satisfy the 
disinterestedness requirements, then the bankruptcy court must deny attorney's fees for the 
period that the conflict existed). 
Moreover, "a client need not prove actual damages in order to obtain forfeiture of an 
attorney's fee for the attorney's breach of fiduciary duty to the client." Burrow v. Arce, 997 
S.W.2d 229,240 (Tx. 1999); Frank v. Bloom, 634 F.2d 1245 (1Oth.Cir. 1980) Erickson submits 
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that Bagley's charging Erickson attorney's fees while Bagley had a conflict of interest is per se 
unreasonable. 
1. Bagley's Had A Conflict Of Interest In Representing Erickson In Preparing 
For The Chapter 12 Filing. 
The court in the Chapter 12 dismissed Bagley from further representation after it found 
Bagley was a Erickson submits that Bagley's "creditor conflict" that prevented 
Bagley from representing Erickson in the Chapter 12 also prevented him from performing work 
necessary to prepare the Chapter 12 for filing. If an attorney cannot represent a client in a 
Chapter 12 because the attorney is also a creditor, then the attorney cannot represent the client in 
preparing for the Chapter 12 filing if that attorney is or will be a creditor when the Chapter 12 
petition is filed. 
Bagley agrees that he had a "creditor conflict" in representing Erickson in the Chapter 12 
before Erickson signed the promissory note.243 In fact, Bagley agrees that he had such a conflict 
for filing the Chapter 12 petition as early as June 28, 1999 because he definitely was one of 
Erickson's creditors at that time.244 In actuality, Bagley's conflict started as early as June 3, 1999 
because Bagley admits that by that time he was "preparing and organizing to file the Chapter 12 
petition."245 Bagley obviously was required to disclose to Erickson that he would have a conflict 
representing Erickson in a Chapter 12. Bagley admits that he did not disclose the conflict to 
Erickson before he filed the Chapter 12 because he did not even see the conflict as an 
Erickson testified that he would not have used Bagley as his attorney to file the Chapter 12 if 
242 See Erickson Exhibits D-156-157. 
2" See Bagley Depo., 84:12-17. 
244 See Bagley Depo., 8 1 :23-82:s. 
245 See Bagley Depo., 80:22-81: 1 .  
2 4 6 ~ e e  Bagley Depo., 88:7-14. 
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Bagley had disclosed to him the conflict that Bagley would have in the Chapter 12.247 
Accordingly, Bagley is not entitled to any attorney's fees for preparation of the Chapter 12. 
2. Bagley Had A Conflict Of Interest In Representinp Erickson And His Wife 
Together In The Chapter 11. 
Bagley prepared and filed a motion to add Kathleen as a ~ o d e b t o r ~ ~ '  while representing 
Erickson and while the Ericksons were going through a divorce.249 Kathleen signed the motion 
on December 14, 1998.~~'  Following his unsuccessful motion, Bagley filed a separate Chapter 
11 petition as counsel for Kathleen while Bagley still represented Erickson and while the 
Ericksons' divorce was still pending.251 Bagley represented Kathleen at least as late as 
September 27, 1999.~~' 
Erickson submits that just as one attorney could not represent both Kathleen and Erickson 
in their divorce, Bagley could not represent both Kathleen and Erickson in the same or separate 
Chapter 11 proceedings addressing joint property issues because Kathleen and Erickson were 
dividing up their property in the divorce. Even Bagley has admitted that "there might be a 
potential conflict" saying, "I could see maybe there is a potential conflict" in representing both 
Erickson and Kathleen in bankruptcy while they had a pending divorce.253 Bagley explained, 
"they would have had a divergent interest in preserving the property, maybe one says don't 
preserve it and the other says do preserve it."254 This explains why on cross examination Bagley 
agreed that from "day one" there was an issue in the divorce court that Erickson wanted to retain 
247 See Tr Vol. I ,  p. 28, L. 18 through p. 29 L. 2 
248 See Erickson Exhibit A-35. 
249 See Erickson Exhibit A-35. 
250 See Erickson Exhibit A-35. 
25' See Erickson Exhibit B-2. 
252 See Erickson Exhibit C-55. 
"'See Bagley Depo., p. 16, LL. 4-7. 
"'See Bagley Depo., p. 16, LL. 8-13. 
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possession of the farm whereas Kathleen did not want to.255 Erickson testified that he wanted to 
save his farm and continue to farm whereas Kathleen wanted to sell the farm and divide the 
Bagley never disclosed to Erickson that there was at least a potential conflict of interest 
in his representing both Erickson and ~ a t h l e e n . ' ~ ~  
Erickson submits that Bagley could represent both Erickson and Kathleen at the same 
time only if Kathleen and Erickson had an agreement on how to divide their property. That 
agreement did not come until Kathleen and Erickson signed the Marital Settlement Agreement 
on October 12, 1999. As a result of Bagley's representing both Erickson and Kathleen while 
they were getting divorced and before they signed the Marital Settlement Agreement on October 
12, 1999, Bagley represented Erickson under a conflict of interest. Erickson submits that 
Bagley's charging Erickson attorney's fees while representing Erickson under a conflict of 
interest is unreasonable. Thus, Bagley's services are inadequate consideration for the note. 
IV. SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT AN AWARD 
OF $29.173.38 BECAUSE THE COURT FAILED TO APPLY $3,000, $830, $9,750, 
AND $8.500 AS SET OFF DAMAGES. 
Erickson paid Bagley $3,000 to represent him in the Chapter 12 where the court 
discharged Bagley because he had a conflict of interest. Because Bagley had a conflict of 
interest in representing Erickson in the Chapter 12, Bagley is not entitled to the $3,000. If 
Bagley had converted to a Chapter 12, Bagley would not have needed to file any bankruptcy 
petition for ~ a t h l e e n ' ~ ~  thus avoiding $830 for the filing fee for Kathleen's Chapter 11 petition 
that Erickson paid.259 The trial court did not give any credit either for the $3,000 or the $830. 
FSB and FNB recovered attorney's fees in the Chapter 12 for the work their attorneys performed 
'*' See Bagley Depo., 17:2-18:l. 
'56SeeTrVol. 11, p. 22, LL. 11-21; see Bagley Depo., p. 17, L. 10 through p. 18, L. 1. 
257 See Bagley Depo., p. 163, L. 21 through p. 164, L. 3; see Tr Vol. 11, p. 29, LL. 3-6. 
See Tr Vol. I ,  p. 71, L. 5 through p. 73, L. 21; see also 11 USC $ 1201. 
2 5 9 ~ e e  Erickson Exhibit B-I. 
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in the Chapter 11 that included the work they did in bringing motions to dismiss the Chapter 
1 1.260 Bagley testified that Erickson had to pay these creditors' attorney's fees for the work the 
creditors' attorneys did in the dismissed Chapter 1 1.26' Shively testified that FSB incurred and 
recovered conservatively $9,750 in attorney's fees262 and that FNB incurred and recovered 
conservatively $8,500 in attorney's fees.263 There was no evidence to contradict these figures. 
But the court gave Erickson no credit for these damages. 
V. 1'11E COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR AT TRIAI. BY REFUSING AND 
AI-LOWING EXPERT TESTIMONY. 
"This Court reviews trial court decisions admitting or excluding evidence, including the 
testimony of expert witnesses, under the abuse of discretion standard." Clark v. Kelin, 137 Idaho 
154, 156 (2002). "In the case of an incorrect ruling regarding evidence, a new trial is merited 
only if the error affects a substantial right of one of the parties." Id. See also Lambert v. 
Northwestern Nut. Ins. Co., 115 Idaho 780 (Ct. App. 1989) (holding that exclusion of expert 
witness testimony was prejudicial error). 
A. The Trial Court Imorooerlv Excluded Expert Testimony From Shively. 
Shively gave her opinion that a reasonable amount of attorney's fees for the work Bagley 
performed would have been $2,227.50.'~~ She based this amount on the bankruptcy code section 
that would have applied to any fee request Bagley might have made had the court not dismissed 
the Chapter 11 .265 She based her opinion on her review of the entire Chapter 11 file, her 
experience in filing 10-15 Chapter 11 fee applications, her experience with Chapter 11 and 
260See Tr Vol. I ,  p. 190, L. 16 throughp. 192, L. 1 ;  p. 193, L. 13 through p. 194, L. 18; p. 197, L. 13 through p. 198, 
L. 9 .  
26'See Bagley Depo., p. 62, LL. 10-17; p. 63, L. 7-9; p. 64, L. 1 through p. 65, L. 4;  p. 192, L. 13 through p. 194, L. 
9 .  
262 See Tr Vol. I ,  p. 193, LL. 13- 19. 
263 See Tr Vol. I ,  p. 197, LL. 13-24. 
264 See Tr Vol. I ,  p. 199, L. 6 through p. 200, L. 4 .  
265 SeeTr Vol. I ,  p. 199, L. 6-20. 
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Chapter 12 fee applications other attorneys have filed because the requirements are the same for 
both Chapter 11 and Chapter 12, her 22 years experience, and the value of the work Bagley 
performed and conferred as the rule requires.266 However, the court would not admit or consider 
Shively's testimony because earlier she testified generally that she does not "have specialized 
training in determining damages"267 and that in her practice she hires damage experts.268 
The court abused its discretion in excluding Shively's opinion because the court 
incorrectly viewed Shively's general statement that she does not "have specialized training in 
determining damages" as disqualifying her from offering an opinion on what a reasonable 
attorney's fee would be for Bagley to have charged for the work that he did perform in the 
Chapter 11 rather than determining whether sufficient foundation was laid based on her training 
and experience for Shively to offer her opinion. Erickson submits that Shively was qualified 
through her training and experience to offer the opinion and that the court's refusal to admit the 
opinion affected Erickson's substantial right to have the court even consider that the reasonable 
value of Bagley's attorney's fees was $2,227.50 rather than $29,173.38 especially when Erickson 
had already paid Bagley a $5,000 retainer. 
B. The Trial Court Imvroverlv Allowed Expert Testimony From Bapley. 
A court's failure to exclude expert testimony that was not properly disclosed and that 
prejudices the opposing party constitutes an abuse of discretion. Clark v. Raty, 137 Idaho 343, 
347 (Ct.App. 2002). "[Fjailure to meet the requirements of Rule 26 'typically' results in 
exclusion of the proffered evidence. The potential for prejudice to the opposing party from the 
admission of evidence that was not disclosed in discovery is particularly acute with respect to 
expert testimony, for as the court noted in Radmer, '[elffective cross-examination of an expert 
266 See TI Vol. I ,  p. 200, L. 22 - p. 203, L. 7. 
267 See Tr Vol. 1, p. 36, LL. 18-21 (emphasis added); p. 203, LL. 8-17. 
268 See Tr Vol. I ,  p. 36, LL. 18-21 (emphasis added); p. 203, LL. 8-17. 
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witness requires advance preparation,' and 'effective rebuttal requires advance knowledge of the 
line of testimony of the other side."' Clark, supra, at 347 (quoting Radmer v. Ford Motor Co., 
120 Idaho 86, 89 (1991)). 
Here, the only witness Sirius called at trial was William Bagley whom the court allowed 
to offer expert testimony that Sirius never disclosed. Erickson filed a written objection269 
because Sirius had failed to disclose Bagley as an expert witness in its discovery responses (even 
though Erickson specifically asked for this information)270 and failed to "disclose in writing" 
Bagley as an expert witness "together with a summary of the testimony" Bagley intended to 
offer, as required in the "ORDER FOR TRIAL, PRE-TRIAL SCHEDULE, AND PRE-TRIAL 
 CONFERENCE."^^' The objection sought an order precluding Bagley from testifying as an 
expert witness or, alternatively, a continuance for Erickson to obtain in discovery Bagley's expert 
opinions and the bases thereof.272 The court denied the objection and motion for a 
continuance.273 The court further overruled Erickson's renewed objection during trial allowing 
Bagley to testify as an expert.274 
Erickson submits that the court's allowing Bagley's expert testimony constituted an 
irregularity in the proceedings of the trial that prevented Erickson from having a fair trial under 
Idaho case law as set out in Clark and Radmer. Because counsel for Erickson did not have 
Bagley's opinions and the bases thereof before trial to prepare an effective cross-examination, 
counsel for Erickson's cross-examination of Bagley was like playing "pin the tail on the donkey" 
rather than a "surgical strike." The trial court lost its patience in this two day trial expressing its 
269 See R Vol. 11, p. 82. 
270 See R Vol. 11, pp. 30-3 1. 
27i See R Vol. 11, p. 83; see "ORDER FOR TRIAL, PRE-TRIAL SCHEDULE, AND PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE" 
dated August 9,2007 as a document contained in the augmented record on appeal. 
272 See R Vol. 11, pp. 82-85. 
273 See Minute Entry and Order dated June 25,2007 as a document contained in the augmented record on appeal. 
274 See Tr Vol. 11., p. 61 LL. 9-21. 
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frustration at counsel for Erickson's patchwork cross-examination sarcastically saying, "Let's 
spend another day on this,"275 and, "It is cumulative, but if Mr. Smith wants to waste the time 
doing it, go ahead, Mr. Smith. I don't know where it is going to get you, but go ahead."276 In the 
end, Erickson was prejudiced by the court's allowing Bagley to testify as an expert. 
VI. DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL. 
Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) mandates an award of attorney's fees in actions to recover 
on a promissory note or other negotiable instrument both at the trial level and on appeal. LC. § 
12-120(3.) Erickson v. Flynn, 138 Idaho 430,438,64 P.3d 959,967 (Ct.App. 2002); 
Intermountain Forest Mgmt., Inc. v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 136 Idaho 233,238, 31 P.3d 921, 
926 (2001). Idaho Appellate Rule 40 allows an award of costs "as a matter of course to the 
prevailing party unless otherwise provided by law or order of the Court." I.A.R. 40(a). Because 
this Court should reverse the district court's judgment, this Court should also award Erickson his 
attorney's fees incurred in this action at the trial level and on appeal. The Court should also 
award Erickson his costs incurred in pursuing this appeal. I.A.R. 40. 
275 See TI Vol. 11, p. 1 1  1,  LL. 12-13 
2 7 6 ~ e e ~ r ~ o l .  11, p. 112, LL. 15-17. 
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CONCLUSION 
For all the reasons set forth in this Opening Brief, Erickson respectfully requests that the 
court reverse the judgment entered against Erickson and remand to the district court for further 
handling. 
DATED this - y d a y  of October, 2009. 
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